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S 2726

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 28, 1967

Breakdown of 1966 firearms cases	
Dicandowie of 1900 firedinis cuses	
MURDER	•
Handgun, purchased illegally from local underworld source	1
underworld source Handgun, stolen locally Handgun, suspect known, origin of gun	2
unknown (noncommital)	1
Total cases	4
	===
ROBERY Rifle, purchased legally from unknown	
local person	3
Handgun, stolen locally———————————————————————————————————	4
legally acquired in another State when residence changed	1
Handgun, accused and origin of fire-	
arm unknown. Rifle, accused and origin of firearm	22
unknown Handgun, claimed by accused to be toy	. 1
handgun	5
Total cases	36
	==
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT Rifle, purchased legally from local	
dealer Handgun, purchased legally from local	1
acquaintance	1
Rifle, purchased legally from local un- known person	. 1
Handgun, purchased illegally from local	
unknown person Rifle, purchased illegally from local un-	. 1
known person————————————————————————————————————	1
underworld source	i
Rifle, stolen locally———————————————————————————————————	1
legally acquired in another State when residence changed	2
Handgun, accused and origin of gun unknown	2
Total cases	11
SUICIDE	
Handgun, purchased legally from local dealer	
Rifle, purchased legally from local	2
clooler	2
Handgun, brought into State, firearm	2
Handgun, brought into State, firearm legally acquired in another State when	
Handgun, brought into State, firearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed	1
dealer Handgun, brought into State, firearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed Total cases	. 2
dealer Handgun, brought into State, firearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed Total cases	1
tealer Handgun, brought into State, firearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed Total cases OFFENSIVELY ARMED Handgun, purchased legally from local dealer	2 1 5
dealer Handgun, brought into State, firearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed Total cases OFFENSIVELY ARMED Handgun, purchased legally from local dealer Haife, purchased legally from local dealer. Handgun, purchased legally from local	1 5
Handgun, brought into State, firearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed. Total cases. OFFENSIVELY ARMED Handgun, purchased legally from local dealer. Rifie, purchased legally from local dealer. Handgun, purchased legally from local acquaintance	2 1 5
dealer Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed Total cases OFFENSIVELY ARMED Handgun, purchased legally from local dealer Rifle, purchased legally from local dealer Handgun, purchased legally from local acquaintance Shotgun, purchased legally from local unknown person	2 1 5
Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed	2 1 5 7 14
dealer Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed Total cases OFFENSIVELY ARMED Handgun, purchased legally from local dealer Rifle, purchased legally from local dealer. Handgun, purchased legally from local acquaintance Shotgun, purchased legally from local unknown person Handgun, purchased illegally from local acquaintance Handgun, purchased illegally from local acquaintance Handgun, purchased illegally from local	2 1 5 7 14 1
Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed. Total cases. OFFENSIVELY ARMED Handgun, purchased legally from local dealer. Handgun, purchased legally from local acquaintance. Shotgun, purchased legally from local unknown person. Handgun, purchased illegally from local acquaintance. Handgun, purchased illegally from local unknown person. Handgun, purchased illegally from local unknown person. Handgun, purchased illegally from local unknown person.	2 1 5
Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed	2 1 5 7 14 1 1 3
dealer Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed Total cases OFFENSIVELY ARMED Handgun, purchased legally from local dealer Rifie, purchased legally from local acquaintance Shotgun, purchased legally from local acquaintance Shotgun, purchased legally from local unknown person Handgun, purchased illegally from local acquaintance Handgun, purchased illegally from local unknown person Handgun, purchased illegally from unknown person, out of State Handgun, stolen locally Rifie, borrowed legally from local ac- qualntance	2 1 5 7 14 1 1 3 5 1
Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed	1 5 7 14 1 1 3 5 1 3 2
Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed	1 7 14 1 1 3 5 1 3 2 2
Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed	1 5 7 14 1 1 3 5 1 3 2
Handgun, brought into State, frearm legally acquired in another State when residence changed	1 7 14 1 1 3 5 1 3 2 2

	Breakdown of 1966 firearms cases—Contin	ued
	CONCEALED WEAPONS, AND SO FORTH	
	Handgun, purchased legally from local	
Į.	dealer	5
ł	Rifle, purchased legally from local dealer_	10
	Handgun, purchased legally from local acquaintance	6
	Rifle, purchased legally from local ac-	. "
Ĺ	quaintance	. 1
:	Handgun, purchased legally from local	
	unknown person	1
	Handgun, purchased legally from out-of-	
ı	State dealer, mail order	2
Ĺ	Handgun, purchased illegally from local	
	acquaintance Handgun, purchased illegally from local	. 2
	unknown person	. 5
l	Rifle, purchased illegally from local un-	
	known person————————————————————————————————————	1
•	Handgun, purchased illegally from un-	
	known person, out of State	2
•	Handgun, found locally	1
, -	Rifle, found locallyHandgun, stolen locally	. 2
•	Rifle, stolen locally	1
١.	Handgun, stolen out of State	ī
•	Handgun, borrowed legally from local	-
	acquaintance	1
	Handgun, borrowed illegally from local	
	acquaintance Rifle, borrowed illegally from local ac-	. 8
	Rifle, borrowed illegally from local ac-	_
	quaintance	2
	legally acquired in another State when	
•	residence changed	12
	Rifle, accused and origin of rifle un-	
	known	8
	. Total cases	67
	/	•
	THE CIA AND THE NATIONAL	
	STUDENT ASSOCIATION	
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	Mr. JACKSON, Mr. President, I	ne-

President, I be lieve my colleagues in the Congress will be interested in seeing the full text of the explanation by 12 former presidents of the National Student Association on the relationship of the NSA to the CIA.

I ask unanimous consent that their responsible and considered statement of February 25, 1967, be printed at this point in the RECORD:

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FEBRUARY 25, 1967. As former presidents of the National Student Association we feel that a responsible and thoughtful explanation of the relation-ship of the NSA to the CIA is desirable. Each of us speaks for the year he served as president.

The international world of the 1950's and early 1960's was largely a bipolar world and that fact was important in shaping NSA's decisions. NSA recognized the vital importance of American student participation in international student affairs which otherwise would have been dominated by the well trained and well informed representatives of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, But our's was no reflex Cold War action. Indeed it was precisely out of NSA's dissent from many aspects of American post war foreign policy which often seemed to us intransigent and inflexible that many of the Association's international programs were born.

NSA believed that there was a critical need for the American student movement to be an active participant in world affairs in or-der to create a more sensible international atmosphere. Students were one important voice among many American voices abroad in a complex world which required that many American viewpoints in addition to the governmental viewpoint be heard.

Three aspects of NSA's international poli-

cles should be emphasized;
... NSA consistently supported and sought to strengthen democratic student organizations in those countries where they existed and encouraged their formation where they did not exist. The political and social importance of students and student organizations was not then widely recognized, but it was evident to us that students were a significant and influential elite in their coun-

NSA's international policy early recognized NSA's international policy early recognized the crucial importance which nationalist movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America would have in shaping our world. NSA's attitude was consistently but not uncritically sympathic to nationalist aspirations. Others were equally aware of those aspirations, but at that time much U.S. foreign colley was still focused upon Furna and the tions, but at that time much U.S. foreign policy was still focused upon Europe and the Soviet Union. There were few institutions through which individuals who felt the urgency of American cooperation with nationalist groups could act. NSA was one such institution.

While we were quite aware of the expansionist ambitions and ideological goals of the Soviet Union, NSA chose to deal with the Soviets and Eastern Europeans not as ideological pariahs but as political adversaries in a changing world. Ve felt that the politics of confrontation would not only hinder Soviet domination of international student life, but would also enable young Soviets and Eastern Europeans to come into contact with the ideas and convictions of young Americans, and vice versa.

Without substantial funds, NSA's interna-

Without substantial funds, NSA's international program would have been immobilized. Yet each of us concluded that, without question, we would have chosen immobilization if the only funds available were conditioned on impairment of the independence of any of NSA's principles or programs. And so the question became whether CIA funds entailed any such conditions. We state categorically that they did not. Each of us after being elected to office was fully informed about the CIA relationship. Allegations that we were "trapped" or "duped" are arrant nonsense. While we constantly searched for alternative sources of funds, this relationship was the only realistic and this relationship was the only realistic and responsible alternative available to us at that time. Each of us authorized its continuation subject to the controls and safeguards which we each deemed necessary to ensure the complete independence and integrity of NSA. One such safeguard was to insist that senior elected officers in succeeding years be informed of the relationship so that no possibility could exist of by-passing the duly elected leadership of the Association, which could reappraise the relationship annually. Each of us maintained the utmost vigilance and independence of judgment during his term of office. Attempts at control would not have been tolerated. Any such attempts would have resulted in an immediate termi-nation of the relationship.

The absence of controls should be absolutely clear to anyone who is either familiar with NSA or willing to take the time to review the record. Each NSA policy and program was adopted by the governing bodies of the Association, the National Student of the Association, the National Student Congresses. For nearly twenty years NSA has remained constant to the principles it established in the late 1940's long before any financial discussion with the government took place. These policies and programs have been consistently independent of and often in conflict with the positions of the government. NSA friends and foes alike have verified this fact throughout NSA's history. Political contexts change. The national

Political contexts change. The national and international situation in which NSA creates its present policies is no longer the one in which we made our decisions. We have always recognized the responsibility of

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each group of current leaders of NSA to lead the organization in the direction which seems to them appropriate during their term of office, subject to the decisions of the governing bodies of the Association.

In retrospect we feel that in the world in which we worked the relationship helped make it possible for the American student movement to make important contributions toward the development of democratic student organizations. We affirm our sense of pride in the free and independent accomplishments of NSA during those years. We reaffirm our conviction that all those individuals who shared in carrying out NSA's international activities did so with honor in the best traditions of American voluntary

William T. Dentzer, Jr., 1952.
James M. Edwards, 1954.
Harry H. Lunn, Jr., 1956.
Stanford L. Glass, 1956.
Harald C. Bakken, 1957.
K. Ray Farabee, 1958.
Robert R. Kiley, 1959.
Donald A. Hoffman, 1960.
Richard A. Rettig, 1961.
Edward R. Garvey, 1962.
W. Dennis Shaul, 1963.
Gregory M. Gallo, 1964.

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, the proposed new legislation calling for a national program in occupational health could not be more timely or more needed. New processes and new sources of energy are presenting health hazards of unprecedented complexity. A new and potentially toxic chemical is introduced into industry approximately every 20 minutes.

Some of the needed corrective measures are very simple, if they are applied. A well engineered and correctly placed ventilating fan will do wonders in protecting the health of a worker or workers. On the other hand, there are other problems that can be solved only through intensive, long-term basic and experimental research.

Asbestos-caused health problems present a case in point. A recent report indicates that exposure to high levels of asbestos dust occurring 20 to 30 years ago is probably responsible for a 21percent increase in the death rate among certain workers. Such association, however, is not controlled enough to give the answers that are needed in order to protect industrial workers. We do not know, for example, whether the asbestos mineral fibers are vehicles or carriers of carcinogenic chemicals or if they are active themselves. Nor do we know that if might not be the degree of hydration in the aspestos silicates or the physical properties of its fibrous structure that caused problems.

A similar problem exists in the case of the soft coal worker's chest disease. We do know that 10 percent of the active miners and 20 percent of the former miners in the soft coal regions of Appalachia have a serious, disabling chest disease. We do not know, however, whether the coal dust itself is to blame or whether some of its constituents, such as aluminum, copper, titanium, or boron, are causing our serious occupational health problems.

Several months ago, another health problem arose which has caused several known deaths and a serious degree of discovered illness. I say "discovered" because only recently have some physicians learned that certain persons who use metal solder containing cadmium are exposing themselves to highly toxic fumes. Vague warnings on packages of cadmium-containing solder are insufficient. In industries where there is heavy use of this material, no warnings at all are provided to the user.

Further complicating the picture in these and other occupational disease problems is the long time that it takes for these diseases to occur even with exposure to low levels of toxic materials. The disease seen today among asbestos workers and coal miners, for example, is associated with exposure to high levels of dust 20 to 30 years ago. Dust levels today are generally much lower, so the problems of the future may again be different.

The only way we are going to get the answers to complicated questions involving industrial health is through expanded research. The answers cannot wait 20 to 30 years, because it will be too late to protect today's workers then. That is why there must be greater emphasis on experimental research. We must be armed with better scientific information upon which we can base preventive measures.

Asbestos and soft coal and cadmium are very important to our Nation's economy. They cannot be cast aside merely because of associated health problems. These natural materials can be used without extreme hazard if we apply existing knowledge and, at the same time, press forward with an expanded research program which will develop a broader approach to our total industrial health problem.

The legislation proposed today will help accomplish these objectives.

BURIALS AT ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the February 25 issue of the Journal of the Armed Forces contains an article by Editor Louis Stockstill which fairly well sums up my views on the new rules for burials at Arlington National Cemetery recently announced by the Department of the Army.

Mr. Stockstill suggests that the Congress must devise suitable solutions for the mounting problem posed by the shortage of burial space for servicemen, veterans and their dependents in our national cemeteries.

If there are no objections, I ask that Mr. Stockstill's article be printed in the RECORD in its entirety.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Burials at Arlington (By Louis Stockstill)

The new Army rules for burials at Arlington National Cemetery no doubt constitute an honest effort to solve a difficult problem. Yet the solution is far from satisfactory.

The main argument for limiting future burials to active and retired members of the Armed Forces, Medal of Honor winners, and Government VIP veterans (The Journal,

18 Feb.), is that at the current burial rate all of the space at Arlington will rapidly disappear.

Plans are underway to expand the cemetery, but this expansion, even when coupled with the new rules, will not prevent all of the space from ultimately becoming exhausted. And it's likely that all of those now on active duty or on the retired rolls will have to be buried elsewhere if they are still living 20 years from now.

So, as far as we are concerned, there is little merit in simply postponing the inevitable by closing the gates to "Selected" veterans.

Present or former Presidents, Vice Presidents, Cabinet officers, Supreme Court Justices, Congressmen, Senators, and a flock of Presidential appointees still would be eligible for Arlington burial, provided they are qualified veterans.

Frankly, we see no reason to permit some obscure, one-term Congressman or short-term sub-Cabinet official—who spent a minimum amount of time in uniform—to be buried in Arlington, when many, more distinguished veterans would be barred.

The new rules, as they apply to veterans, can only be an all-or-nothing proposition. The weakness of the Army plan is underlined by the creation of an "excepted" group—a move which could easily be interpreted as an effort to make the plan more palatable to those who would be in a favored position to otherwise oppose it.

Although our military readers consist almost entirely of active and retired personnel, we cannot in all conscience (nor do we believe they would want us to) ignore the fact that they have no more legal right to burial at Arlington than any other veteran.

The Cemeteries initially were authorized as burial grounds for men killed in combat or dying of battle wounds during the Civil War. They were not established for all active duty personnel, or for retirees, or for veterans, or for high Government officials.

Veterans first were authorized to be buried

Veterans first were authorized to be buried in the Cemeteries 10 years after the Civil War (The Journal, 22 March 1873). Their rights, therefore, are as firmly established in both statute and tradition as those of the combat dead. Over the years, eligibility for burial in the Cemeteries has been consistently broadened.

If the rules must now be revised, then Congress—not the Army—should assume the responsibility for making such revisions as are necessary and justified. Congress represents the people. And, the people should have some voice in deciding the fate of our National Cemeteries, which, after all, were erected and are maintained and supported by the tax dollars of the entire population.

As we see it, three different problems must be solved.

If it is considered desirable to have a national burying ground for State Funerals of former, present and future top Government officials, it is time we developed a new cemetery solely for this purpose.

And, if Arlington, the most famous and

And, if Arlington, the most famous and historic military cemetery in the Nation, is to be permanently closed during this century, as the Army intimates, then neither is it too early to start planning and developing another Arlington—perhaps one specifically set aside for our combat dead, for our military heroes, for those in uniform who lay down their lives for their country in whatever endeavor.

And, too, our other veterans cannot be ignored. Congress must devise some suitable solution for them.

We think the most appropriate commentery on the entire problem might be one that was made several years ago in a related context by the former Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee.

When the Army, in an economy move, sought to eliminate the traditional funeral horses at Arlington, Chairman Vinson pro-